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Malaysia: Danamodal Nasional Berhad (Danamodal)1 
Devyn Jeffereis2 
Yale Program on Financial Stability Case Study 
November 12, 2021 
Abstract 
The Malaysian economy was relatively well positioned at the beginning of the Asian 
Financial Crisis. However, the government’s response of tight fiscal and monetary policy, 
along with contagion from surrounding countries, had severe negative consequences. The 
banking industry became particularly vulnerable due to substantial loan growth preceding 
the crisis and exposure to volatile sectors, leading to an increase in NPLs and capital 
deterioration. As part of its approach to assist the ailing banking sector, the Bank Negara 
Malaysia created Danamodal Nasional Berhad (Danamodal) on August 10, 1998, as a 
wholly owned subsidiary aimed at recapitalizing banking institutions. Funding for 
Danamodal came from RM3 billion in central bank seed capital and RM7.7 billion of five-
year zero-coupon bonds. Beneficiaries submitted a recapitalization strategy to Danamodal, 
which performed assessments in conjunction with external advisors to determine the 
viability of the institution and required injection amounts. The first phase of injections 
consisted of interim Tier 2 Capital; beneficiaries then negotiated and signed Definitive 
Agreements that converted the temporary capital into various types of permanent capital 
and outlined a long-term relationship with Danamodal. Danamodal appointed two 
nominees to the beneficiary’s board of directors with additional appointments dependent 
on the amount of Tier 1 capital injected. Through its Board presence, Danamodal facilitated 
mergers and implemented behavioral reforms. Injections through Danamodal totaled 
approximately RM7.6 billion into 10 banking institutions and all funds were repaid by 2007 
resulting in a final pre-tax profit of RM200 million. 
Keywords: Board nominees, Definitive Agreements (DAs), Exchangeable Subordinated 
Capital Loans (ESCL), first-loss principle, interim capital 
 
1 This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project 
modules considering broad-based capital injection programs. Cases are available from the Journal of Financial 
Crises at   
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises/. 






At a Glance  
As the Asian Financial Crisis began 
spilling over into the Malaysian 
economy, its banking industry quickly 
began to struggle. Substantial loan 
growth preceding the crisis and 
exposure to volatile sectors had led to 
an increase in non-performing loans 
(NPLs) and deterioration of capital. As 
part of a larger plan, on August 10, 
1998 the Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) 
created Danamodal Nasional Berhad 
(Danamodal), a wholly owned 
subsidiary aimed at recapitalizing 
banking institutions. The BNM funded 
this Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) with 
RM3 billion in BNM seed capital and 
RM7.7 billion of five-year zero-coupon 
bonds.  
Danamodal, along with international 
advisors, reviewed submissions and 
performed analyses on banking 
institutions to determine their viability 
and required injection amounts. 
Initially, Danamodal injected 
Exchangeable Subordinated Capital 
Loans (ESCL), a form of Tier 2 Capital, 
as a temporary injection to allow for 
further due diligence and negotiation. 
During this interim period, 
beneficiaries signed Definitive Agreements that converted ESCL into permanent capital and 
outlined a long-term relationship with Danamodal. The three primary forms of permanent 
capital included Common Shares, Irredeemable Non-Cumulative Convertible Preference 
Shares (INCEPS), and Subordinated Loans. The different instruments provided a range of 
expected returns, control, and subordination. Following the injection of capital, Danamodal 
appointed nominees to the beneficiary’s Board of Directors based on the amount of Tier 1 
Capital injected. Through its Board presence, Danamodal facilitated mergers and 
implemented behavioral reforms. In addition, Danamodal worked with beneficiaries to 
create performance targets and closely monitored their progress. Over its lifetime, 
Summary of Key Terms 
Purpose: To recapitalize and strengthen the Malaysian 
banking industry, while acting as an active shareholder 
and Board representative to instigate mergers and 
revamp corporate governance among beneficiaries 
Announcement Date July 13, 1998 
Operational Date August 10, 1998 
Sunset Date December 31, 2003 
Program Size RM16 billion authorized 
Usage RM7.59 billion by 10 
institutions  
Outcomes Risk-weighted capital ratio 
(RWCR) for beneficiaries 
increased from 9.9% in 
September 1998 to 12.3% by 
the end of December 1999 
Key Features  Injections were initially in the 
form of Exchangeable 
Subordinated Capital Loans 
and then were converted to 
other types of capital after 
further due diligence; part of a 
coordinated government 
package to address the 
financial crisis. 
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Danamodal injected approximately RM7.6 billion into 10 banking institutions, resulting in 
an increase of risk-weighted capital ratio (RWCR) for beneficiaries from 9.9% at end of 
September 1998 to 12.3% at end of December 1999. 
Summary Evaluation 
All beneficiaries exited the scheme by 2007 resulting in a final pre-tax profit of RM200 
million. Although Danamodal has been credited as an essential part of the banking 
industry’s recovery from the Asian Financial Crisis, the IMF raised issues regarding its 
strategy to spur lending and enhance beneficiaries’ leadership and corporate governance.  
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Malaysia Context 1997–1998 
GDP 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU  
converted to USD) 
$101.4 billion in 1997 
$72.4 billion in 1998 
GDP per capita 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU  
converted to USD) 
$4,638 in 1997 
$3,263 in 1998 
Sovereign credit rating  
(five-year senior debt) 
 
Data not available for 1997 




Size of banking system 
 
$137.9 billion in 1997 
$110.7 billion in 1998 
Size of banking system  
as a percentage of GDP 
100% in 1997 
100% in 1998 
Size of banking system  
as a percentage of financial system 
100% in 1997 
100% in 1998 
Five-bank concentration of banking system 
64.8% in 1997 
61.5% in 1998 
Foreign involvement in banking system 18% in 2001 
Government ownership of banking system 0% in 2001 
Existence of deposit insurance 
Yes in 2008 
Yes in 2009 
Sources: Bloomberg; World Bank Global Financial Development Database; World Bank 
Deposit Insurance Dataset; Cull, Martinez Peria, and Verrier 2018. 
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In the years preceding the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC), market participants hailed East Asia 
as the global growth center for the next century, stemming from years of substantial 
economic growth through international inclusion, external facing strategy, and 
conservative fiscal policy (Abidin 2000). As a result, East Asian economies experienced 
“rapid export-driven growth, relatively low inflation, rising per capita incomes and reduced 
poverty.” Unfortunately, certain characteristics of East Asia’s rapid growth created a 
precarious economic situation that ultimately precipitated financial market turmoil. After 
years of pegged currency exchange rates, many regional currencies required realignment 
against the U.S. Dollar. The overvaluation of currencies fed a perception of uncompetitive 
export sectors and currency-peg instability. Additionally, macroeconomic imbalances 
began building as short-term investment from foreign investors financed large current 
account deficits across the region. Foreign capital began flowing into domestic financial 
markets as well. The final vulnerability emerged in the banking sector, where high credit 
growth in preceding years and the increase of funds flowing to illiquid and high-risk 
sectors such as property and equity markets had led to overall fragility. Eventually the 
increasing of interest rates to manage inflation and halt capital outflows exacerbated issues 
in this sector as asset quality weakened and non-performing loans (NPLs) rose (BNM 
1997). 
The immediate response by East Asian governments to curb currency pressures included 
hiking interest rates, direct currency exchange intervention, and implementing selective 
measures to curtail speculation. This approach proved untenable as foreign exchange 
reserves dwindled and other interventions had a perverse impact on domestic markets. 
The first clear indication of the AFC occurred when Thailand was forced to abandon its 
currency peg and float the Thai Baht on July 2, 1997, resulting in a rapid depreciation of the 
Baht by about 10-15%. Economies such as the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, 
Korea, Hong Kong, and Taiwan quickly felt the effects of this shock (BNM 1997). 
Malaysia’s economy remained strong at the onset of the crisis, with an economic expansion 
of 7.8% in 1997 (BNM 1997). Unlike other East Asian economies, it did not implement an 
IMF-supported plan or receive IMF financial assistance due to its relatively strong balance 
of payments position and its lower foreign debt load (BNM 1998a; Lindgren et al. 2000). 
However, the initial Malaysian response consisted of tight fiscal and monetary policy, 
similar to the IMF recommendation to neighboring countries (Abidin 2000). Examples of 
such policies included “reducing the current account deficit in the balance of payments, 
increasing the fiscal surplus through significant cutbacks in public sector expenditure, 
reducing credit growth and containing inflationary expectations by tightening further 
monetary policy” (BNM 1997). These measures aimed to repair market confidence in 
Malaysia, stem economic pressures, and stabilize the exchange rate (Abidin 2000). The 
government also targeted the banking sector by introducing stricter regulations regarding 
the categorization of NPLs and requiring increased transparency from financial institutions 
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(BNM 1997). However, it became clear that tighter fiscal and monetary policy had a 
deleterious impact on the economy as real output in 1998 declined 6.7% following twelve 
years of continuous expansion, averaging 7.8% annually. In response to these negative 
consequences, the Malaysian government decided to reverse course; it began to relax fiscal 
policies in March 1998 and ease monetary policy in August 1998. By this time, financial 
market turmoil had taken its toll; the Malaysian stock market, the Kuala Lumpur Stock 
Exchange (KLSE), fell by 72% and the Malaysian ringgit depreciated by 40% against the 
U.S. dollar from pre-crisis levels (BNM 1998a). 
Similar to the overall economy, the Malaysian banking sector was well situated at the 
beginning of the AFC; this strength was displayed through quality of assets, strong 
capitalization, and prudential supervision (BNM 1998a). The primary forms of deposit-
taking institutions within the banking sector included commercial banks, finance 
companies, and merchant banks (IMF 1999). Across the banking sector, by the end of June 
1997, the risk-weighted capital ratio (RWCR) was 12% (substantially above the minimum 
of 8%) and net NPL ratios were 2.2%. In addition, the Banking and Financial Institutions 
Act 1989 (BAFIA) provided an integrated approach to bank supervision in Malaysia 
through regulations dictating capital ratios, transparency, and risk management (BNM 
1998a).  
Despite this perceived strength, underlying structural issues resulted in a deterioration of 
the Malaysian financial sector as the crisis continued. One contributing factor was the 
meteoric loan growth, averaging approximately 25% per year, between 1994–97. The 
private sector was especially reliant on banking sector financing due to the 
underdeveloped bond market (BNM 1998a). Increased lending led to elevated credit levels 
relative to GDP and significant credit exposures by institutions to at-risk sectors including 
property and equity markets (IMF 1999).  
Due to the protracted crisis and ensuing contraction in economic activity, NPLs increased 
and capital deteriorated within financial institutions. By the end of June 1998, the net NPL 
ratio increased to 8.9% while RWCR had decreased to 11.2% (still above the 8% minimum) 
for the system as a whole (BNM 1998a).  
The ailing banking sector prompted the Malaysian government to implement a multi-
faceted policy approach to restore confidence in financial markets and struggling banking 
institutions (BNM 1998a). 
Program Description 
In July 1998, the National Economic Action Council (NEAC), on behalf of the Malaysian 
government, released a National Economic Recovery Plan (NERP) that outlined a strategy 
of government intervention. One stated goal of the NERP was recapitalizing the struggling 
banking sector to stabilize financial markets (Danamodal n.d.a). On August 10, 1998, 
Danamodal Nasional Berhad (Danamodal) was incorporated as a wholly owned subsidiary 
of Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM), the central bank of Malaysia. This Special Purpose Vehicle 
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(SPV) would serve two purposes: inject capital into banks and, through its shareholder 
role, merge core and weaker institutions and improve their management (BNM 1998a). 
Danamodal’s Board of Directors included BNM representatives as Chairman, Managing 
Director, and other additional members along with a nominee from the Ministry of Finance 
and private sector appointees (Danamodal 1998a).  
After performing a number of stress tests in various scenarios, BNM estimated the 
maximum budget for Danamodal to be RM16 billion. This amount would guarantee that the 
RWCR across the banking industry would stay above 9% (Danamodal n.d.a). Funding for 
Danamodal came from RM3 billion in BNM seed capital and RM7.7 billion of five-year zero-
coupon bonds with a nominal value of RM11 billion, five-year maturity, and yield to 
maturity (YTM) of 7.25% (Danamodal n.d.a; Danamodal n.d.c). The bonds traded on the 
secondary market for Malaysian government securities. Unlike bonds issued by Danaharta, 
Danamodal’s sister agency that purchased nonperforming loans, Danamodal’s bonds did 
not carry an explicit government guarantee. However, they carried an implicit guarantee. 
BNM accepted them as collateral at its discount window and treated them as government 
securities on bank balance sheets in calculating banks’ liquidity and capital requirements 
(IMF 1999). 
Danamodal aimed to inject capital into viable, core, domestic banking institutions “based 
on commercial and market-oriented principles” (BNM 1998a; BNM 1998b). Beneficiaries 
submitted individual capital injection strategies accounting for various operating and NPL 
scenarios prior to receiving funds (Danamodal 1998a). Danamodal would then assess the 
future viability of the institution, analyzing quantitative and qualitative factors (Danamodal 
n.d.a). Goldman Sachs and Salomon Smith Barney (then a unit of Citigroup) served as 
external advisors throughout this process, assisting a variety of projects including 
assessments and due diligence reviews (BNM 1998a; Danamodal n.d.a). 
During the first phase of recapitalization, Danamodal injected Exchangeable Subordinated 
Capital Loans (ESCL), a form of Tier 2 Capital (Danamodal 1999a). It bore an interest rate 
of 7.5% annually and a three-month maturity; beneficiaries had the option to extend the 
maturity if required. After receiving the interim ESCL, beneficiaries negotiated and signed 
Definitive Agreements (DAs) that converted ESCL into permanent capital and outlined a 
long-term relationship with Danamodal (BNM 1998a; Danamodal n.d.a). The three types of 
permanent capital were Common Shares, Irredeemable Non-Cumulative Convertible 
Preference Shares (INCEPS), and Subordinated Loans. The different instruments provided a 
range of expected returns, control, and subordination (Danamodal n.d.a). Danamodal 
valued its investments based on market-based methods (Danamodal n.d.b).  
Danamodal stringently observed a “first-loss” principle throughout the process, whereby 
“shareholders would be required to bear all losses before the recapitalisation by 
Danamodal” (BNM 1998a). Adherence to this principle resulted in beneficiaries selling 
their NPLs to Danaharta, an asset management company created to purchase NPLs from 
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banks, prior to receiving capital injections from Danamodal.3 The individual needs of each 
beneficiary, including safety (application of first-loss principle), control, return, capital 
base, exit potential, and monitoring requirements, would dictate the structure of its 
investments (Danamodal n.d.a). 
Following the injection of capital, Danamodal would appoint a minimum of two nominees 
to serve as Executive Director and either Chairman or Deputy Chairman on the Board of 
Directors of beneficiary institutions. The amount of Tier 1 Capital injected dictated greater 
Board representation. Through its Board presence, Danamodal expected to facilitate 
mergers and implement behavioral reforms such as “sound risk management practices and 
credit culture, good corporate governance and higher operational efficiencies” (BNM 
1998a). In addition, Danamodal worked with beneficiaries to create performance targets 
and closely monitored their progress (Danamodal n.d.b). 
Danamodal stated that it had an expected lifespan of no more than five years, with the 
majority of capital injections occurring during the first two years (Danamodal n.d.a; 
Danamodal n.d.b). Beneficiaries exited the scheme through “initial public offering, strategic 
sales of its holdings, and sales of its holdings directly in the market” (Danamodal n.d.b). 
Outcomes 
Danamodal injected RM6.15 billion of ESCL into 10 banking institutions in 1998, resulting 
in an increase in RWCR across the banking system from 11.2% at end of June 1998 to 
11.9% at end of January 1999 (BNM 1998a). Throughout 1998 to 1999, all ten beneficiary 
banks, with the exception of Perdana Merchant Bankers, finalized their injection amounts 
and terms through Definitive Agreements (Danamodal 1998c; Danamodal 1999d). 
Danamodal performed no additional capital injections following December 1999 (BNM 
2001a). The composition of the injections are shown in Figure 1 and balances over time are 
shown in Figure 2. 
  
 
3 For more information on Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Berhad (Danaharta) see Dreyer (2021) in the 
Journal of Financial Crises.  
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Loan - Tier 2 
RHB Bank Berhad 1,500 
November 
30, 1998 






– – 600 200 
MBf Finance Berhad 2,280 
March 12, 
1999* 






483 – 317 – 
Oriental Bank Berhad 700 
March 30, 
1999 






– – 200 300 











– – – 400 
Sabah Bank Berhad 140 
February 
12, 1999 






50 – – – 
Total 7,590  551 636 4,147 2,256 
*Danamodal injected RM680 million of Subordinated loans into MBf Finance Berhad on December 30, 1999. 
**Perdana Merchant Bankers received an injection of ESCL on November 13, 1998. 
Source: Danamodal 1999a; Danamodal 1999b; Danamodal 1999c; Danamodal 1999d.  
The actions taken by Danamodal supported mergers and acquisition activity within the 
sector. On October 8, 1998, Danamodal announced its intent to invest RM1.5 billion in the 
RHB Bank and Sime Bank merger. Following its purchase of Sime Bank for RM852.2 
million, RHB Bank approached Danamodal to assist in a previously estimated RM1 billion 
capital shortfall (Danamodal 1998b). The injection of funds was estimated to resulted in an 
increase in capital adequacy to 10.5% and was performed on October 21, 1998 (Danamodal 
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1998b; Danamodal 1998d). Danamodal announced its plan to inject an additional RM723.4 
million for a 30% share in RHB Capital on November 30, 1998 (Danamodal 1998d). 
However, Khazanah Nasional Berhad made this investment instead of Danamodal after 
expressing its interest and Danamodal’s determination “that Khazanah is in a better 
position to undertake such an investment” (Danamodal 1998e).4 RHB Bank was later 
acquired by Bank Utama during merger exercises performed by the BNM (Cook 2008).  
Danamodal became controlling shareholder in MBf Finance following its initial injection of 
RM1.6 billion in exchange for a 70% stake (Danamodal 1999c). The divestment of its 
injection resulted in further consolidation as Danamodal sold its stake to Arab-Malaysian 
Finance on August 3, 2001. The total price of the acquisition was RM925 million, composed 
of RM475 million in cash and RM450 million contingent on NPL recoveries (Danamodal 
2001b). The sale recouped funds from the RM1.6 billion injection, although it resulted in an 
RM675 million loss. Additional mergers included EON Bank acquired Oriental Bank, Affin 
Bank acquired BSN Commercial Bank (M), Southern Bank acquired United Merchant 
Finance and Perdana Merchant Bankers, and Multi-Purpose Bank acquired Sabah Bank 
(BNM 2000; Danamodal 2001a; Danamodal 2000c). It is important to note that some of 
these mergers were a result of the broader effort by the Malaysian government to 
consolidate the banking sector and occurred after Danamodal funds had been paid back 
(BNM 2000). 
Danamodal implemented behavioral reforms through its board representation alongside 
broader efforts by BNM to improve corporate governance. As part of this effort, BNM 
issued a framework for standard credit risk management by financial institutions. These 
guidelines covered appropriate oversight by the board of directors and management, 
adequate infrastructure for credit risk management, an integrated risk-management 
process, and comprehensive internal controls and audit procedures. Additional reforms 
included constructing a sector-wide training program for lending officers, limiting external 
interference in lending decisions, and intermittent assessments by BNM on executives 
based on whether they were “fit and proper” (Sulaiman 1999). 
Over its lifetime, Danamodal injected approximately RM7.6 billion into 10 banking 
institutions, substantially less than the maximum budget of RM16 billion (BNM 2003). For 
these beneficiaries, the capital injections by Danamodal resulted in RWCR increasing from 
9.9% at end of September 1998 to 12.3% at end of December 1999 (BNM 1999). On 
October 21, 2003, the five-year, zero-coupon bonds issued by Danamodal matured and 
operations ceased on December 31, 2003. At the time of its wind down, Danamodal had 
RM2.2 billion in assets remaining and RM1 billion of capital outstanding in RHB Bank (BNM 
2003). These final holdings and assets were liquidated by the end of 2007, resulting in all 
institutions exiting the scheme and a final pre-tax profit of RM200 million (BNM 2007).  
 
4 Khazanah Nasional Berhad is the sovereign wealth fund of Malaysia.  
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(December 20, 2001) 
RHB Bank Berhad 1,000 1,000 1,000 
Arab-Malaysian Bank  
Berhad 
 800   460 460 
MBf Finance Berhad 2,280 2,280 680 
United Merchant  
Finance Berhad 
– – –  
Oriental Bank Berhad 700 – – 
Arab-Malaysian  
Finance Berhad 
– – – 
BSN Commercial  
Bank (M) Berhad 
420 – –  
Arab-Malaysian  
Merchant Berhad 
– – –  
Sabah Bank Berhad – – – 
Perdana Merchant  
Bankers Berhad 
– – –  
Total 5,200 3,740 2,140 
Sources: Danamodal 2000a; Danamodal 2001c; Danamodal 2001d. 
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II. Key Design Decisions 
1. The Malaysian Government adopted a three-pronged approach—one 
component of which was recapitalization—to address the financial crisis 
and strengthen the banking sector. 
The Malaysian government instituted a three-pronged approach to assist its ailing banking 
sector during the AFC. The three interventions dealt with purchasing Non-Performing 
Loans (NPLs), recapitalization, and debt restructuring. It included: 
(1) Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Berhad (Danaharta): an asset management 
company that purchased and managed NPLs from banking institutions;  
(2) Danamodal Nasional Berhad (Danamodal): a special purpose vehicle (SPV) that 
injected capital into banking institutions;  
(3) Corporate Debt Restructuring Committee (CDRC): a debt restructuring agency that 
allowed borrowers and creditors to negotiate agreements and avoid legal 
proceedings (BNM 1998a). 
Each individual program interacted with one another in various ways. For example, banks 
sold their NPLs to Danaharta at fair market value, resulting in substantial losses. In a 
healthy economic environment, these banks would be able to raise capital to make up for 
this shortfall through shareholders. However, due to uncertain financial conditions, there 
was insufficient appetite from investors. Therefore, Danamodal stepped in to recapitalize 
these institutions and restore capital levels. In fact, Danamodal required beneficiaries to 
sell their NPLs to Danaharta in order to receive capital injections, resulting in existing 
shareholders bearing the losses associated with these sales. Additionally, if negotiations 
undertaken by the CDRC could not reach a consensus, Danaharta purchased the NPLs from 
the dissenting institutions, which assisted the restructuring process (BNM 1998a). 
Due to the overlap between programs, shown in Figure 3, the Malaysian government 
created a Steering Committee that coordinated the interventions of Danaharta, Danamodal, 
and CDRC. The Governor of the BNM chaired the Steering Committee, which met every two 
weeks. Its primary responsibilities included ensuring “operations of these institutions are 
well coordinated and complement each other, and to keep track of their progress” as well 
as properly sequencing interventions (BNM 1998a). 
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Figure 3: Malaysia’s Multi-Pronged Approach 
 
Source: Author’s analysis based on BNM 1998a. 
2.  Danamodal was a limited liability company and wholly owned subsidiary 
of BNM. 
Danamodal was legally categorized as a limited liability company and incorporated on 
August 10, 1998 as a wholly owned subsidiary of BNM (BNM 1998a; Danamodal 1998a). Its 
governance structure reflected this ownership as its board of directors had BNM 
representatives as Chairman, Managing Director, and other additional members. The board 
also consisted of a nominee from the Ministry of Finance and private sector appointees 
(Danamodal 1998a). 
3. BNM announced the creation of Danamodal through a press release and 
maintained transparency throughout its existence. 
On July 13, 1998, BNM announced the creation of an SPV to recapitalize the banking 
system. The press release occurred two months after the creation of Danaharta and it 
references the SPV as a complement to it; “as Danaharta was set up to help remove NPLs 
from the banking system, there is a need for us to explore other pre-emptive alternatives to 
recapitalise the banking system.” The approach to recapitalization included a dual 
objective: 
(1) To inject government capital, both in “core” banking institutions and in weaker 
institutions that BNM identified as viable; 
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(2) To merge core and weaker banking institutions, taking advantage of its role as a 
strategic shareholder (BNM 1998b). 
The press release outlined a number of characteristics of the SPV including structure, 
lifespan, financing requirements, and operation and financing arrangements. It explains 
that the SPV would receive seed capital from BNM, with additional funding through bond 
issuances, and have a finite lifespan with the goal of selling its holdings once it achieved its 
objectives. The maximum expected budget was RM16 billion, which would maintain a risk-
weighted capital ratio (RWCR) above 9% across the banking system. In addition, BNM 
would leverage international consultants to construct the operating details and financing 
arrangements of the SPV (BNM 1998b). 
Danamodal was transparent in disclosing changes in management, operations, and 
selection criteria. A significant number of these announcements occurred through press 
releases. It also issued financial statements that aligned with international accounting 
standards (BNM 1998a). Deloitte Touche Tomatsu, an independent and external vendor, 
audited these annual financial statements. 
4. Danamodal strictly employed a “first-loss” principle during interventions. 
Under the “first-loss” principle, “existing shareholders were required to bear all losses 
prior to recapitalization.” In practice, the application of this principle required banks to 
mark down the value of existing shareholders investments to accurately reveal net tangible 
assets and sell their NPLs to Danaharta prior to receiving capital injections from 
Danamodal. This forced shareholders to realize the losses stemming from declining 
investments and NPL sales. In addition, it resulted in “equitable burden sharing” and 
reduced the use of public funds (BNM 1998a). 
The “first-loss” principle also played an integral role in the negotiation of Definitive 
Agreements (DAs), which specified the terms and types of capital used in capital injections 
(Danamodal 1999a). 
5. Danamodal conducted an industry-wide stress test and determined it 
needed RM16 billion to recapitalize the banking sector. 
The worst-case scenario estimated by BNM dictated a budget of RM16 billion. This funding 
amount would guarantee that the RWCR across all banking institutions would be at least 
9% (BNM 1998a). To estimate a maximum budget the BNM conducted a preliminary, 
industry-wide stress test in May 1998 that examined how banking institutions performed 
based on a variety of parameters and assumptions. The analysis looked at institution-
specific characteristics such as projected NPLs, specific provisions (property and shares), 
investments, and off-balance-sheet items. In addition, it included environmental factors 
such as interest rates (three-month Kuala Lumpur Interbank Offered Rate or KLIBOR), 
foreign exchange (USD/MYR exchange rate), real estate (property prices), equity markets 
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(Kuala Lumpur Composite Index), and contagion risk from exposure to Indonesia, Thailand, 
Korea (Danamodal n.d.a). 
The results of the stress test, shown in Figure 4, prescribed a maximum funding 
requirement of RM16 billion, approximately 12% of Malaysia GDP. This was broken down 
into two phases; the first phase would recapitalize 14 banking institutions that the BNM 
deemed very likely to experience solvency issues and required a total of RM12.8 billion to 
bolster their RWCR to greater than 9%. The second phase involved 11 institutions that the 
BNM felt had a lower likelihood of experiencing solvency issues. Therefore, the BNM 
allocated RM1.6 billion to ensure that the RWCR of these lower-risk institutions stayed 
above 9%. In addition, the BNM added a precautionary 10% buffer, totaling RM1.6 billion 
(Danamodal n.d.a). Only 10 of the 14 institutions identified in the phase-one analysis 
received injections, as “Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Berhad, Bank of Commerce Berhad, 
Perwira Affin Bank Berhad and Utama Merchant Bank Berhad…opted for their own 
solutions to address their capitalisation issues” (Danamodal 1999c). Improved market 
conditions made injections for the institutions associated with phase two unnecessary (IMF 
1999). 
Figure 4: Stress Test Results 
Type of 
Institution 
Number of Institutions Injection Amount Total 
Injection 
Amount (RM 
billion) Phase 1 Phase 2 
Phase 1 (RM 
billion) 




8 5 8,586 475 9,061 
Finance 
Companies 
3 6 3,603 1,094 4,697 
Merchant 
Banks 
3 – 579 52 631 
(10% buffer) –  –  –  –  1,611 
Total 14 11 12,768 1,621 16,000 
 
Source: Danamodal n.d.a. 
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6. The recapitalizations were funded through seed capital from BNM and 
bond issuances. 
In order to fund itself, Danamodal received RM3 billion in seed capital from BNM 
(Danamodal n.d.a). It then raised an additional RM7.7 billion on October 21, 1998, through 
the issuance of zero-coupon bonds (Danamodal n.d.c). The BNM decreased its statutory 
reserve requirement from 6% to 4% in conjunction with this issuance (Cook 2008; IMF 
1999). It also required banks to use the additional liquid capital from the lowered 
requirement to buy Danamodal bonds (Cook 2008). The bonds had a nominal value of 
RM11 billion, five-year maturity, yield to maturity (YTM) of 7.25%, and qualified as a class-
one liquid asset with zero risk-weighting for capital requirements. Additionally, Danamodal 
had the ability to extend the duration of the bonds, either partially or fully, by a minimum 
of one year and maximum of five years. The new YTM, if Danamodal triggered the maturity 
extension, would equal the “sum of the average YTMs of Malaysian Government Securities 
(MGS) of similar or closest tenor to the extension period and 50 basis points (Danamodal 
n.d.c). Unlike Danaharta, Danamodal’s bonds did not carry an explicit government 
guarantee (BNM 1998a). However, the bonds carried an implied government guarantee 
since Danamodal was wholly owned by BNM (IMF 1999). 
Initially, 57 banking institutions subscribed to the Danamodal bond issuance and future 
pricing and liquidity were determined by the secondary market for Malaysian government 
securities, where Danamodal’s bonds regularly traded (Danamodal n.d.a; IMF 1999). On 
October 21, 2003, Danamodal redeemed its bonds at maturity at a nominal value of RM11 
billion (BNM 2003). 
7. Goldman Sachs and Salomon Smith Barney served as independent advisers 
during the recapitalization process. 
Danamodal leveraged the expertise of “reputable, international financial advisors,” 
Goldman Sachs and Salomon Smith Barney (BNM 1998a; Danamodal n.d.a). They were 
selected due to their ability to: 
(a) Immediately provide highly trained resources, bridging the learning curve gap;  
(b) Supplement Danamodal’s resources needed to meet performance expectations;  
(c) Provide a third party objective and independent viewpoint;  
(d) Provide expert advice skills and methodologies to ensure an effective 
recapitalization process (Danamodal n.d.a).  
The advisors had a number of functions, such as performing assessments and due diligence 
reviews (BNM 1998a). These reviews were a prerequisite to receive funds and aimed to 
gauge the overall health of the beneficiary as well as determine the amount of capital 
required (BNM 1998a; IMF 1999). Other responsibilities included the construction of an 
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operational infrastructure along with overall policies and procedures governing capital 
injections (Danamodal n.d.a). 
8. To determine the viability of beneficiary institutions and recapitalization 
amounts, Danamodal conducted comprehensive individual assessments. 
Along with BNM, Goldman Sachs, and Salomon Smith Barney, Danamodal worked to assess 
the long-term prospects for each institution (Danamodal n.d.b; IMF 1999). The selection 
process included an in-depth analysis of competitive position and financial standing of each 
banking institution, quantification of potential synergies to be realized through 
consolidation, and CAMEL (capital, assets, management, earnings, and liquidity) analysis 
(Danamodal 1998a). The banks that were selected as beneficiaries were identified in the 
first phase of stress tests and defined as very likely to experience solvency issues 
(Danamodal 1999c). The risk profiles of these banks were determined through the stress 
tests outlined in KDD 5 (Danamodal n.d.a). Of the original 14 banks identified in phase one, 
10 received capital injections, while Bank Bumiputra, Bank of Commerce, Perwira Affin 
Bank, and Utama Merchant Bank secured alternative solutions (Danamodal 1999c). Bank 
Bumiputra Malaysia and Bank of Commerce were merged with government assistance 
outside of Danamodal; Perwira Affin Bank acquired BSN Commercial and did not require a 
further injection of capital; and Utama Merchant Bank was recapitalized by its 
shareholders. It is important to note that none of the banks identified as lower-risk 
institutions in the second phase received injections (IMF 1999). 
Figure 5: Danamodal Recapitalization Assessment Process 
  
Source: Danamodal n.d.a. 
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9. Danamodal injected Tier 2 capital then signed Definitive Agreements (DAs) 
with beneficiary institutions, converting the capital into three types of 
securities. 
Danamodal would first inject Tier 2 subordinated debt, in the form of Exchangeable 
Subordinated Capital Loans (ESCL), which was converted into equity, debt, or hybrid 
capital through Definitive Agreements (DAs) (BNM 1998a; IMF 1999). ESCL bore an 
interest of 7.5% annually and had a three-month maturity, with the option for beneficiaries 
to extend. The temporary funds allowed for additional due diligence and negotiations prior 
to conversion (Danamodal 1999a).  
Following this interim period, stakeholders signed DAs that outlined recapitalization 
amount and instruments used (including the decision whether to convert the ESCL into 
permanent Tier 1 and/or Tier 2 capital), pricing of instruments, investment protection, exit 
option, shareholder’s call option (Danamodal n.d.a). It is important to note that Danamodal 
used market-based valuation methods in making investment decisions (Danamodal n.d.b). 
The DAs varied across institutions due to the unique situation of each individual 
beneficiary, and time constraints required an accommodating and practical approach. Six 
main principles guided Danamodal’s structuring of investments: safety (application of first-
loss principle), control, return, capital base, exit potential, and monitoring requirements 
(Danamodal n.d.a).  
The three primary instruments used for capital injections by Danamodal and their 
characteristics are outlined in Figure 6. The different instruments allowed Danamodal to 
tailor injections to the issues faced by the at-risk institution. The composition of the capital 
injection depended “primarily on the cash flow characteristics of the instruments and the 
unique circumstances of the banking institutions concerned” (BNM 1998a). 
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Sources: Danamodal Nasional Berhad n.d.a; Danamodal 1998a, BNM 1998a. 
10.  In order to institute behavioral reforms and facilitate mergers, Danamodal 
appointed nominees to the boards of beneficiaries. 
Danamodal appointed a minimum of two nominees to serve as Executive Director and 
either Chairman or Deputy Chairman on the Board of Directors of beneficiary institutions. 
The amount of Tier 1 Capital injected dictated additional Board representation beyond the 
minimum two appointees. Through its Board presence, Danamodal facilitated mergers and 
implemented behavioral reforms such as “sound risk management practices and credit 
culture, good corporate governance and higher operational efficiencies” (BNM 1998a). 
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The restructuring process employed by Danamodal encompassed improvements in 
financial analysis and capital frameworks, operations, IT, organizational structure, human 
resources, and the beneficiary’s business portfolio. The initial phase consisted of an 
internal and external situation assessment, followed by the development of a strategic plan 
(strategic position, operational design, IT design, etc.) and implementation plan (changes in 
restructuring, governance, consolidation, etc.) (Danamodal n.d.a). 
11. Danamodal created performance targets for the beneficiary institutions 
and monitored their progress towards these targets. 
Prior to receiving capital injections, beneficiaries were required to provide a 
comprehensive business plan and establish, in conjunction with Danamodal, “a list of 
comprehensive performance targets, monthly reporting, and swift and firm remedial 
actions against the banks in the event of material shortfalls in performance relative to such 
targets” (Danamodal n.d.b). Danamodal closely monitored these performance targets, 
tightening its overall approach to banking supervision. This included requiring financial 
statement reporting to the BNM on a quarterly, semi-annual, and yearly basis, along with 
weekly and monthly balance sheet disclosure. The BNM also deployed CAMEL-based 
supervision, which focused on capital adequacy, asset quality, and management, regarding 
both in-person assessments, which were increased to a minimum of once per year for all 
banks, and external monitoring. Additional supervisory changes included BNM approval of 
financial statements prior to public disclosure and creation of “prompt corrective 
measures” which created pre-agreed responses by bank managers and owners to breaches 
of regulatory levels (IMF 1999). 
Many of the indicators that were assessed are outlined in Figure 7. 
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Rate of Migration of 
Performing Loans to 
Non-Performing 
Loans 
• Monitor percentage of loans in each loan class (current, 
substandard, doubtful, bad) on a monthly basis 
• Monitor loan migration between classes of loans 
NPL Recovery 
• Monitor amount of NPLs converted into collateral 
• Monitor amount of collateral sold in each period 
Average Recovery 
Rate 
• Make assessments of FMV of underlying collateral on all 
categories of loans on a periodic basis 
• Monitor actual cash values received versus estimates. Encourage 
cash sales of collateral/loans 
Net Interest Margin 
• Monitor performance and trend of Net Interest Margin on a 
monthly basis 
• Identify sources of strengths and weaknesses of Net Interest 
Margin 




• Performance of fee-based business lines as well as prospects for 
growth 




• Identify and monitor the sources of strengths and weaknesses in 
overall cost structure 
Non-Interest 
Expense Growth 
• Encourage major focus by management on appropriate level of 
overhead needed to match current business opportunities 
• Detailed management reports on salary, overhead expenses, and 
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other operational costs 
Cost to Income 
Ratio 
• Benchmark progress in improving overall efficiency relative to 
other institutions 
Loan Growth 
• Gross loan production figures provided monthly with periodic 
assessment of negative or positive trends 
• Amounts and trend of new loan disbursements 
Deposit Growth 
• Total deposit figures provided monthly with periodic 
assessment of any trends 
Source: Danamodal n.d.a. 
12. BNM anticipated that the recapitalization process would take five years. 
At inception, BNM predicted that the recapitalization process would take no more than five 
years. This timeframe would allow Danamodal to accomplish its short and medium-term 
objectives and make significant headway towards the long-term goal of industry 
consolidation and restructuring (Danamodal n.d.a). It is important to note that Danamodal 
expected the majority of capital injections to occur during the first two years (Danamodal 
n.d.b). Danamodal’s exit strategy followed the below principles: 
(a) Seize the earliest chance to exit;  
(b) Achieve objectives of recapitalization or enhance prospects of future achievement; 
(c) Aim for full recovery of investments;  
(d) If the overall economic recovery helps to restore solvency issues among banking 
institutions, the need for Danamodal’s continued involvement may be reduced;  
(e) Adhere to the overall policies views of the Malaysian government and BNM 
regarding the timing of the exit (Danamodal n.d.a). 
On October 31, 2003, approximately five years after its creation, Danamodal closed its 
operations (BNM 2003). It exited the scheme through “initial public offering, strategic sales 
of its holdings, and sales of its holdings directly in the market” (Danamodal n.d.b). 
III. Evaluation 
BNM championed the success of the Danamodal program; it found that the speedy creation 
and implementation of the scheme was an essential part of the banking industry’s recovery 
from the AFC. The capital injections performed by Danamodal helped struggling but viable 
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banking institutions raise capital and instill enhanced corporate governance (BNM 2003). 
This resulted in beneficiaries resuming lending activities and led to increased consumer 
confidence along with a revival of business and economic activities in the domestic real 
sector (BNM 2003; Danamodal n.d.a). In addition, BNM stated that Danamodal’s strict 
observance to the “first-loss” principle successfully minimized the total cost of 
recapitalization (BNM 2003). BNM felt the capital injections were performed “with a strong 
commercial orientation, focus on speed and outcomes, transparency in [Danamodal’s] 
policies and operations, sense of public accountability and credibility, and bias for hope and 
possibilities” (Danamodal n.d.a). 
On the other hand, the IMF expressed concerns regarding Danamodal’s attempts to replace 
ineffective leadership with more capable alternatives. In particular, the IMF feared, even 
with new senior leadership, the potential for “inadequate, ineffective, or otherwise 
deficient management teams [to] remain.” This could lead to similar issues occurring in the 
future. Additionally, the IMF felt that the emphasis on loan growth by BNM and the 
interventions aimed at sparking growth had the potential to generate poor quality loans 
(IMF 1999). 
Abidin (2000) credits the Malaysian government’s interventions as having “made serious 
efforts and registered good progress in restructuring its financial and corporate sectors,” 
specifically citing the success of Danaharta and Danamodal. These two programs were 
particularly effective “because they were executed efficiently, in a transparent manner and 
at a cost much lower than that incurred by the other crisis-hit countries” (Abidin 2000). 
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V. Key Program Documents 
Summary of Program 
(BNM 1998a) Bank Negara Malaysia Annual Report 1998   
The annual report from the Malaysian central bank outlining the economic conditions and 
providing an outline of Danamodal.   
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/bank-negara-malaysia-annual-report-1998. 
(Danamodal n.d.a) “Danamodal Nasional Berhad - the Malaysian approach to bank 
recapitalisation, revitalisation and restructuring”   
An overview from Danamodal of the recapitalization and restructuring efforts. 
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/danamodal-nasional-berhad-malaysian-approach-bank-
recapitalisation-revitalisation-and.  
(Danamodal n.d.b) “Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) on Danamodal.”  
An FAQ document from Danamodal providing information on its operations.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/frequently-asked-questions-faqs-danamodal.  
(Danamodal 1998a) Details on Establishment of Danamodal Nasional Berhad   
A notice on the establishment of Danamodal and details surrounding its operations. 
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/details-establishment-danamodal-nasional-berhad.  
Legal/Regulatory Guidance 
(BNM 2001b)  Best Practices for the Management of Credit Risk   
Guidance from the central bank on risk-management practices for banks.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/best-practices-management-credit-risk.  
(Danamodal n.d.c) Salient Terms and Conditions of the Bonds    
The term sheet for the Danamodal bonds.   
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/salient-terms-and-conditions-bonds. 
Press Releases/Announcements 
(BNM 1998b) Recapitalisation and Consolidation of the Banking Sector   
A press release from the central bank on the plan to recapitalize and consolidate the banking 
sector.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/recapitalisation-and-consolidation-banking-sector.  
(BNM 2000) Consolidation of Domestic Banking Institutions   
A press release on the consolidation of the banking sector in Malaysia.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/consolidation-domestic-banking-institutions. 
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 (Danamodal 1998b)  Danamodal Plans to Inject RM1.5 billion into RHB Bank  
A notice on Danamodal’s plans to inject capital into a bank in 1998.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/danamodal-plans-inject-rm15-billion-rhb-bank. 
(Danamodal 1998c) Danamodal to Inject RM50 billion into Perdana Merchant Bankers 
Berhad  
A notice on Danamodal’s plans to inject capital into a bank in 1998.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/danamodal-inject-rm50-billion-perdana-merchant-
bankers-berhad. 
(Danamodal 1998d) Danamodal Concludes Capital Injection of RHB Bank Berhad and Buys 
30% of the Bank   
A notice on Danamodal’s support to RHB Bank and government ownership of the bank. 
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/danamodal-concludes-capital-injection-rhb-bank-
berhad-and-buys-30-bank.  
(Danamodal 1998e)  Khazanah’s Interest in RHB  Bank  
A press release on the potential interest in one of the banks receiving support via Danamodal. 
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/danamodal-concludes-capital-injection-rhb-bank-
berhad-and-buys-30-bank.  
(Danamodal 1999a) Danamodal Nasional Berhad today signed Definitive Agreements with 
four banking institution   
A press release on Danamodal’s support to four banking institutions in 1999.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/danamodal-nasional-berhad-today-signed-definitive-
agreements-four-banking-institution. 
(Danamodal 1999c) Danamodal Injects RM1.6 billion into MBF Finance Berhad   
A press release on Danamodal’s support to MBF Finance Bank in 1999.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/danamodal-injects-rm16-billion-mbf-finance-berhad. 
(Danamodal 1999d) Danamodal Signs Definitive Agreements with Oriental Bank Berhad 
and United Merchant Finance Berhad  
A press release on Danamodal’s support to two banks in 1999.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/danamodal-signs-definitive-agreements-oriental-bank-
berhad-and-united-merchant-finance. 
(Danamodal 2000a) Investments in Recapitalised BIs  
A summary of the support to banking institutions in Malaysia through February 2000.   
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/investments-recapitalised-bis-0.    
(Danamodal 2000c) BSN Commercial Bank (M) Fully Repaid Danamodal's Loan of RM420 
Million 
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 (Danamodal 2001a) Repayment of Danamodal’s Loan of RM700 Million to Oriental Bank 
Berhad  
A press release announcing the repayment of Danamodal’s support by Oriental Bank Berhad. 
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/repayment-danamodals-loan-rm700-million-oriental-
bank-berhad.  
(Danamodal 2001b) Danamodal Signed S&P Agreement With Arab-Malaysian Finance 
Berhad for the Sale of 100% Equity Interest In MBf Finance Berhad  
A press release announcing the sale of Danamodal’s interest in a financial institution.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/danamodal-signed-sp-agreement-arab-malaysian-
finance-berhad-sale-100-equity-interest-mbf. 
(Danamodal 2001c) Investments in Recapitalised Bis   
A summary of the support to banking institutions in Malaysia through October 2001. 
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/investments-recapitalised-bi.    
(Danamodal 2001d) Investments in Recapitalised Bis  
A summary of the support to banking institutions in Malaysia through December 2001. 
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/investments-recapitalised-bi.  
(Sulaiman 1999) Governor's Keynote Address at the National Credit Management 
Conference  
A transcript from a speech given by the central bank governor in 1999.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/governors-keynote-address-national-credit-
management-conference.  
Key Academic Papers  
(Abidin 2000) Malaysia’s alternative approach to crisis management   
A journal article outlining the Malaysian government’s response to the Asian financial crisis. 
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/malaysias-alternative-approach-crisis-management. 
(Cook 2008) Banking Reform in Southeast Asia: The region’s decisive decade   




(BNM 1997) Bank Negara Malaysia Annual Report 1997   
The annual report from the Malaysian central bank outlining the economic conditions.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/bank-negara-malaysia-annual-report-1997.  
(BNM 1999) Bank Negara Malaysia Annual Report 1999  
The annual report from the Malaysian central bank outlining the economic conditions.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/bank-negara-malaysia-annual-report-1999. 
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(BNM 2001) Bank Negara Malaysia Annual Report 2001  
The annual report from the Malaysian central bank outlining the economic conditions.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/bank-negara-malaysia-annual-report-2001. 
(BNM 2003) Bank Negara Malaysia Annual Report 2003  
The annual report from the Malaysian central bank outlining the economic conditions.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/bank-negara-malaysia-annual-report-2003.   
(BNM 2007) Financial Stability and Payment Systems Report    
The biannual report from the central bank on financial stability in Malaysia.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/bank-negara-malaysia-financial-stability-and-payment-
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Appendix A: Timeline of Interventions 
Date Actions Taken by the Malaysian Government 
July 2, 1997 Thailand forced to abandon its currency peg and float the Thai Baht 
resulting in depreciation of the Baht by 10-15% 
January 1998 The Malaysian Government created the National Economic Action 
Council 
March 1998 The Malaysian Government begins to relax previously tight fiscal 
policies 
May 1998 BNM performed a stress test to ascertain the likely size of a 
recapitalization scheme 
June 20, 1998 Danaharta, an asset management company for the purchase and 
management of NPLs, was incorporated 
July 1998 The NEAC announced a comprehensive National Economic Recovery 
Plan (NERP) to bring about stability and expedite economic recovery 
July 13, 1998 BNM releases a press release describing its recapitalization plan 
August 1998 The Malaysian Government begins to ease previously tight monetary 
policy 





The Malaysian Government introduces selective exchange control 
measures/fixes the RM3.80 to USD 
October 21, 1998 Danamodal issued RM7.7 billion in five-year, zero-coupon bonds 
November 13, 
1998 
Danamodal injected RM50 billion into Perdana Merchant Bankers 
November 30, 
1998 
Danamodal signed DA with RHB Bank Berhad 
February 5, 1999 Danamodal signed DA with Arab-Malaysian Bank Berhad, Arab-
Malaysian Finance Berhad, BSN Commercial Bank (M) Berhad, and 
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Arab-Malaysian Merchant Berhad 
February 12, 
1999 
Danamodal signed DA with Sabah Bank 
March 12, 1999 Danamodal signed DA with MBf Finance Berhad 




Final Injection performed by Danamodal 
October 21, 2003 Bonds issued by Danamodal mature 
December 31, 
2003 
Danamodal ceased operations 
Sources: BNM 1997; BNM 1998a; BNM 1998b; BNM 2001a; BNM 2003; Danamodal 1998c; Danamodal 1998d; 
Danamodal 1999a; Danamodal 1999b; Danamodal 1999c; Danamodal 1999d; Danamodal n.d.a; Danamodal 
n.d.c.  
 
Appendix B: Breakdown of Injection Process 
 




• To assess the criticality of 
capital deficiency 
• To quantify the amount of 
capital required by the 
banks to withstand the full 
impact of the crisis 
• Establish the framework to assess 
capital needs 
• Establish methodologies and tools to 
assess recap requirements 
• Conduct due diligence 
• Quantify capital needs 
Recapitalization/ 
Investment 
• To speedily inject capital 
into viable banking 
institutions 
• To structure investment 
in order to optimize safety, 
control, return, capital 
• Establish selection criteria and assess 
each potential candidate against these 
criteria, which will include (but would 
not be limited to): criticality of capital 
deficiency, systematic impact of the 
bank’s failure, non-feasibility of market 
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adequacy, exit potential, 
and monitoring capabilities 
• To satisfy stakeholders’ 
expectations 




solutions, potential synergies to be 
realized through consolidation, and 
specific requests from shareholders 
• Formulate options 
• Structure the recapitalization 
investment (i.e. price, terms and 
conditions, type of securities) 
• Negotiate with banks on recap 
amount, valuation, timing, mode of 
investment, representation, and other 
terms and conditions 
• Finalize contractual agreements 
Financing of the 
Recapitalisation 
• To obtain cost-effective 
funds to finance 
Danamodal’s 
recapitalization initiatives 
• Ascertain the funding requirements 
vis-à-vis quantum and timing 
• Evaluate financing alternatives 
(sources and modes of financing) 
• Liaise with BNM and other agencies to 




• To restore stability 
• To effect turnaround 
• To use shareholder’s 




efficiency, and improve 
profitability 
• To protect the value of 
investments through 
constant monitoring of 
financial, operational, and 
managerial performance of 
banks 
• Participate actively in the corporate 
governance process 
• Influence management agenda 
• Establish performance targets and 
regular reviews of performance/status 
• Act decisively and effectively in 
dealing with deviations from 
expectations 
• Formulate restructuring strategies 
and determine specific policies and 
instruments for achieving the goals 
• Seize opportunities to strengthen the 
banking sector through consolidation 
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• To promote consolidation 
and restructuring of the 
industry 
and restructuring 
Exit • To dispose of 
Danamodal’s stake in 
banks and optimize returns 
on Danamodal’s 
investments and the 
achievement of 
restructuring objectives 
• Determine timing and amount of 
disposals 
• Evaluate disposal alternatives: initial 
public offerings (IPOs), strategic sales, 
and direct sale to market 
• Distribute gains on disposal to 
Danamodal’s shareholders 
Source: Danamodal n.d.a.  
Copyright 2021 © Yale University. All rights reserved. To order copies of this material or to receive 
permission to reprint any or all of this document, please contact the Yale Program on Financial 
Stability at ypfs@yale.edu.  
473
The Journal of Financial Crises Vol. 3 Iss. 3
